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Appellees, May Department Stores and Payless ShoeSource submit the following 
Brief of Appellees. 
JURISDICTION 
The defendants agree with the plaintiffs Statement of Jurisdiction. 
ISSUES 
1. Was the trial court correct in concluding that the plaintiff is barred from 
bringing an action for bad faith and for negligent infliction of emotional distress against her 
employer because of the exclusivity provision in the Utah Workers' Compensation Act, Utah Code 
Annotated § 35-1-1-60, et. seq.l 
2. Was the trial court correct in concluding that the plaintiff cannot maintain 
a bad faith claim against the defendants as plaintiff is not in privity of contract with the defendants9 
3. Was the trial court correct in concluding that the plaintiffs claim for 
negligent infliction of emotional distress was barred because the plaintiff was not threatened with 
physical injury? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Plaintiff appeals the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants. 
For the purposes of this appeal, the facts of this case are undisputed and plaintiffs appeal raises 
only a question of law. Accordingly, this Court reviews the trial court's order for correctness. 
Schurtz v. BMW of N. Am,, Inc., 814 P.2d 1108 (Utah 1991). Further, a reviewing court may affirm 
1 
a grant of summary judgment on any ground available to the trial court, even if it is one that was 
not relied on below. Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231 (Utah 1993). 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 
Utah Code Annotated § 35-1-12(2): 
When injury is caused by the wilful failure of an 
employer to comply with the law or any lawful order of 
the commission or the employer's own written 
workplace safety program, compensation as provided 
for in this title shall be increased fifteen percent, except 
in case of injury resulting in death. 
Utah Code Annotated § 35-1-46(2) 
The commission is authorized and empowered to 
maintain a suit in any court of this state to enjoin any 
employer, within the provisions of this chapter, from 
further operation of the employer's business, where the 
employer has failed to provide for the payment of 
benefits in one of the three ways provided in this 
section Upon a showing of failure to so provide, the 
court shall enjoin the further operation of the 
employer's business until the payment of these benefits 
has been secured by the employer as required by this 
section. The court may enjoin the employer without 
requiring bond from the commission. 
Utah Code Annotated § 35-1-60(1) (1995): 
The right to recover compensation pursuant to the 
provisions of this title for injuries sustained by an 
employee whether resulting in death or not, shall be the 
exclusive remedy against the employer and shall be the 
exclusive remedy against any officer, agent, or 
employee of the employer and the liabilities of the 
employer imposed by this act shall be in place of any 
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and all other civil liability whatsoever, at common law 
or otherwise, to the employee or to his spouse, widow, 
children, parents, dependents, next of kin, heirs, 
personal representatives, guardian, or any other person 
whomsoever, on account of any accident or injury or 
death, in any way contracted, sustained, aggravated, or 
incurred by the employee in the course of or because of 
or arising out of his employment, and no action at law 
may be maintained against any employer or against any 
officer, agent, or employee of the employer based upon 
any accident, injury, or death of an employee. Nothing 
in this section, however, shall prevent an employee, or 
his dependents, from filing a claim with the Industrial 
Commission of Utah for compensation of those cases 
within the provisions of the Utah Occupational Disease 
Act, as amended. . . . 
Utah Code Annotated § 35-1-78(1) and (3) (1995): 
(1) The powers and jurisdiction of the commission 
over each case shall be continuing. The 
commission, after notice and hearing, may from 
time to time modify or change its former 
findings and orders. 
(3) Awards made by the commission shall include 
interest at the rate of eight percent per annum 
from the date when each benefit payment would 
have otherwise become due and payable. 
Utah Administrative Rule 568-1-14(C): 
Failure to make payment or to deny a claim within the 
forty-five day time period without good cause shall 
result in a referral of the insurance company to the 
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Insurance Department for appropriate disciplinary 
action and may be cause for revocation of the self-
insurance certification for a self-insured employer. . . . 
Utah Administrative Rule 568-2-5(E): 
(E) employees cannot be billed for treatment 
of their industrial injuries or occupational 
diseases. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
Plaintiffs complaint alleged violation of public policy, insurance bad faith, 
negligent infliction of emotional distress and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Plaintiff 
is appealing issues pertaining to the dismissal of the bad faith claim and the negligent infliction of 
emotional distress claim. 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below. 
Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on or about October 12, 1995. 
Judge Leslie A. Lewis heard oral argument on April 9, 1996. The Court granted defendants' 
Motion with regards to plaintiffs claims for bad faith, intentional infliction of emotional distress 
and violation of public policy, but not with regards to plaintiffs claim for negligent infliction of 
emotional distress. The Court reasoned that plaintiff had no privity of contract with the defendants 
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and therefore could not maintain a cause of action for bad faith. (See Order dated May 8, 1996, R. 
at 314-318.) 
On November 1, 1996, defendants filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the 
remaining claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress, which was granted on January 7, 
1997. Judge Lewis found that plaintiffs claim for emotional disturbance could not stand because 
Utah law allows a negligent infliction of emotional distress claim only where the individual 
claiming such injuries has been physically injured, threatened with physical injury, or in the "zone 
of danger" of physical injury because of defendants' conduct, none of which were alleged here. 
(See Order dated January 7, 1997, R. at 377-379.) 
C. Facts. 
1. Appellees are self-insured for workers' compensation purposes. 
{See Complaint; ^ 7, R. at 1-8.) 
2. The Western Region Claims Office in Los Angeles, California of May 
Department Stores, Inc. handles the workers' compensation claims for Payless ShoeSource, Inc , 
as well as for other corporations. (See Complaint, 1|10; R. at 1-8.) 
3. Plaintiff was assaulted while employed at a Payless Shoe Store on or about 
January 20, 1991. As a result of the injuries sustained in the assault, plaintiff filed a workers' 
compensation claim with defendants. (See Complaint; R. at 2.) 
4. Plaintiff obtained an order from the Utah Industrial Commission on January 
13, 1994, regarding her January 1991 workers' compensation claim. Plaintiff alleged that 
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defendants failed to pay certain medical bills which were required to be paid by the Order of the 
Utah Industrial Commission. (See Complaint; R. at 1-8.) 
5. Plaintiff failed to return to the Utah Industrial Commission to seek 
enforcement regarding any noncompliance by defendants with the Industrial Commission Order. 
Plaintiff instead sought relief in the District Court by filing the Complaint in this action in March 
of 1994. (See R. at 185.) 
6. Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on or about October 12, 
1995. Judge Leslie A. Lewis heard oral argument on April 9, 1996. The Court granted defendants' 
Motion with regards to plaintiff for bad faith, intentional infliction of emotional distress and 
violation of public policy, but not with regard to plaintiffs claim for negligent infliction of 
emotional distress. The Court reasoned that plaintiff had no privity of contract with the defendants 
and therefore could not maintain a cause of action for bad faith. (See Order dated May 8, 1996; R 
at 3 14-318.) 
7. On November 1, 1996, defendants filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the 
remaining claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress, which was granted on January 7, 
1997. Judge Lewis found that plaintiffs claim for emotional disturbance could not stand because 
under Utah law, a negligent infliction of emotional distress claim is allowed only if the individual 
claiming such injuries has been physically injured, threatened with physical injury, or in the "zone 
of danger" of physical injury, none of which were alleged here. (See Order dated January 7, 1997; 
R. at 377-379.) 
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8. Plaintiff appeals the trial court's ruling regarding the scope of the exclusivity 
provision of the Workers' Compensation Act, the necessity of privity of contract for a bad faith 
claim, and whether a negligent infliction of emotional distress cause of action requires personal 
injury or the threat of physical injury. (See Docketing Statement on file herein). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Plaintiff is barred from maintaining her actions for claims relating to bad faith and 
for negligent infliction of emotional distress against her employer because of the exclusivity 
provision of the Utah Workers' Compensation Act , Utah Code Annotated § 35-1-60, which 
provides plaintiff her sole remedy. An employee is limited to recourse and recovery under the 
Workers' Compensation Act; that remedy is in lieu of ordinary tort remedies. To allow a separate 
civil action would abrogate the exclusive remedy protection available to the employer and the 
authority of the Industrial Commission. 
Plaintiffs claims relating to "bad faith" against the defendants also fail because 
plaintiff is not in privity of contract with defendants. Plaintiffs status as an employee is that of a 
third-party claimant, who, pursuant to a long line of Utah law, cannot maintain an action for bad 
faith against defendants. This issue was most recently addressed in Savage v. Educators Ins. Co , 
908 P.2d 862 (Utah 1995), and the holding there is directly applicable at bar. 
Even if plaintiff s NIED claims were not barred by the exclusivity provision of the 
Utah Workers' Compensation Act, plaintiff cannot recover under a negligent infliction of emotional 
distress cause of action because plaintiff did not suffer physical injury nor was she placed in actual 
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physical peril by defendants. Plaintiffs claim is for negligent infliction of emotional distress 
without any risk of bodily harm and thus her negligent infliction of emotional distress claim must 
fail. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PLAINTIFF IS BARRED FROM MAINTAINING AN ACTION FOR 
BAD FAITH AND FOR NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL 
DISTRESS AGAINST HER EMPLOYER BECAUSE THE UTAH WORKERS' 
COMPENSATION ACT PROVIDES THE EXCLUSIVE REMEDY FOR PLAINTIFF 
A. The Workers' Compensation Act Precludes Civil Liability Against Defendants. 
If plaintiff has a claim or complaint against defendants, it is a workers' 
compensation claim handled by the Industrial Commission, which has exclusive jurisdiction over 
such claims. Plaintiff brings her tort actions as an attempt to circumvent the repercussions of her 
failure to exhaust her administrative remedies. Recognizing a cause of action in favor of employees 
against an insurer for the manner in which a claim is adjusted is inconsistent with the workers' 
compensation scheme and can do substantial harm to the system as a whole. Savage v. Educators 
Ins. Co., 908 P.2d 862, 867 (Utah 1995). 
Utah law is clear. The right to recover workers' compensation is the exclusive 
remedy against an employer or its agents. Utah Code Ann. §35-1-60 provides: 
The right to recover compensation pursuant to 
the provisions of this title for injuries sustained by an 
employee, whether resulting in death or not, shall be the 
exclusive remedy against the employer and shall be the 
8 
exclusive remedy against any officer, agent, or 
employee of the employer and the liabilities of the 
employer imposed by this act shall be in place of any 
and all other civil liability whatsoever, at common law 
or otherwise, to the employee . . . on account of any 
accident or injury or death, in any way contracted, 
sustained, aggravated, or incurred by the employee in 
the course of or because of or arising out of his 
employment, and no action at law may be maintained 
against an employer or against an officer, agent, or 
employee of the employer based upon any accident, 
injury, or death of an employee. . . 
Utah Code Ann. §35-1-60 (1953) (amended 1995) (emphasis added). An injured employee's 
recovery under workers' compensation laws is in lieu of ordinary tort remedies. Lantz v. Nat'/. 
Semi-Conductor Corp., 775 P.2d 935 (Utah App. 1989). This immunity from tort liability extends 
to the employer's insurer. See e.g., Everfieldv. State Compensation Ins. Fund, 115 Ca. App.3d 15, 
171 Cal. Rptr. 164, 165 (1981) (allegations of consistently delayed payments resulting in emotional 
suffering were not sufficient for action against the Fund); Sullivan v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co , 367 
So.2d 658 (Fla. App. 1979) cert, denied, 378 So.2d 350 (Fla. 1979) (court found injuries arising 
from lack of medical treatment were incidental to original compensable injury; workers' 
compensation is sole remedy available). The Utah Supreme Court in Savage quoted the Florida 
Court of Appeals with approval: 
[BJeyond the legalistic objection to appellant's position, 
we must point out that if delay in medical service 
attributable to a carrier could give rise to independent 
third-party court actions, the system of workmen's 
compensation could be subjected to a process of partial 
disintegration. And the practical operation of the plan, 
minor delays in getting medical service, such as for a 
few days or even a few hours, caused by a carrier, could 
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become the basis of independent suits, and these could 
be many and manifold. The uniform and exclusive 
application of the law would become honeycombed 
with independent and conflicting rulings of the courts. 
The objective of the legislature and the whole pattern of 
workmen's compensation could thereby be partially 
nullified. 
Savage, 908 P.2d at 867, quoting Sullivan v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., supra, 367 So.2d at 660-61 
(quoting Noe v. Traveler's Ins. Co., 172 Cal. App. 2d 731, 342 P.2d 976, 979, 980 (D.Ct. App. 
1959)). Plaintiffs claims which arise from the alleged delay in payments of plaintiffs medical 
providers are subject to the exclusive remedy provision as explicitly provided in the Utah workers' 
compensation statutes. 
Defendants, in accord with Utah Code Ann. §35-1-46, provide the requisite workers' 
compensation by being self-insured. Defendants could have chosen to be insured through the 
Workers' Compensation Fund or through authorized private insurance. Defendants chose to 
comply with the law and protect their employees through self-insurance. There is no rational 
reason to expose self-insured employers to more claims than employers who are either privately 
insured, who are insured through the Workers' Compensation Fund, or who are self-insured but 
have their claims handled by an administrator (as was the case in Savage). 
B. Utah Workers' Compensation Statutes Provide Plaintiff With Protection From 
Liability for Medical Bills. 
Plaintiff alleges that defendants failed to pay medical bills knowing that plaintiff 
"would receive continued demands for payment of the bills. . . and . . . would suffer emotional 
distress and would be harmed as to her credit reputation" in support of her claim for negligent 
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infliction of emotional distress. Utah Workers' Compensation law is clear as to the liability for 
such medical expenses. Section 35-1-45 provides: 
Each employee . . . who is injured . . . by accident 
arising out of and in the course of his employment, . . . 
shall be paid compensation for loss sustained on 
account of the injury . . . and such amount for medical, 
nurse, and hospital services . . . . The responsibility for 
compensation and payment of medical, nursing, and 
hospital services and medicines, and funeral expenses 
provided under this chapter shall be on the employer 
and its insurance carrier and not on the employee. 
Utah Code Ann. §35-1-45 (1995) {emphasis added). Further, the Utah Administrative Code, 
Industrial Commission Rules, R568-2-5(E) specifically states that "[e]mployees cannot be billed 
for treatment of their industrial injuries or occupational diseases." Utah Admin. R.568-2-5(E). 
Plaintiff suffered no injury to her credit reputation. Her only basis for that allegation 
was being informed that she had a "blip" on her credit report. The plaintiff never actually saw her 
credit report and, moreover, was not denied credit on any occasion. (Deposition of plaintiff, pp 
21-23; R. at 209-211). Further, the plaintiff was aware that she was not responsible to pay any 
medical provider: 
Q. (by defendants' attorney): 
So you understood that was their [Western Region Claims Office's] 
responsibility to pay that as part of the Worker's Compensation 
process. Correct? 
A. (by plaintiff): 
Yes, I did understand that. 
(Deposition of Plaintiff, p. 63; R. at 214.) 
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Utah Workers' Compensation law explicitly provides protection for an employee 
from any liability for payment of medical services. A medical provider could not bring an action 
against an employee seeking collection. The plaintiff, at bar, knew and understood that the bills 
she received were to be paid through the workers' compensation process and that she was not liable 
for unpaid bills. 
C. The Industrial Commission Has Continuing Jurisdiction With Appropriate 
Remedies Available. 
Plaintiff was injured in January of 1991. Plaintiff obtained an Order from the 
Industrial Commission in January of 1994. Plaintiff filed her action in Third District Court in 
March of 1994. Utah Code Ann. §35-1-78 provides that "[t]he powers and jurisdiction of the 
commission over each case shall be continuing. The commission, after notice and hearing, may 
from time to time modify or change its former findings and orders. . . . " Utah Code Ann. §35-1-78 
(1994). This section also provides that an interest rate be added to awards: 
(2) Awards made by the Industrial Commission shall 
include interest at the rate of 8% per annum from the 
date when each benefit payment would have otherwise 
become due and payable. 
Utah Code Ann. §35-1-78(2) (1990) (amended 1995). Thus, had she returned to the appropriate 
forum, plaintiff could have sought such interest penalty as may have been appropriate. Section 35-
1-12 provides that no employer shall "fail to obey and follow orders of the Commission . . .." Utah 
Code Ann. §35-1-12 (1953) (amended 1995). In fact, if plaintiff feels that she needs another 
remedy, she could make an argument (before the Industrial Commission) for the penalty provided 
in that section: 
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. . . [w]here injury is caused by the willful failure of an 
employer to comply with the law or any lawful order of 
the industrial commission, compensation as provided 
for in this title shall be increased fifteen percent, except 
in case of injury resulting in death. 
Utah Code Ann. §35-1-12 (1953) (amended 1995). 
Rule 568-l-14(C) of the Utah Administrative Code provides yet another remedy for 
plaintiffs claims: "Failure to make payment without good cause shall result in referral of insurance 
companies to the Insurance Department for appropriate disciplinary action and may be cause for 
revocation of the Certificate of Self-Insurance from self-insured employers." Utah Administrative 
Code R. 568-1-14(C). Further, Utah Code Annotated § 35-1-46(2) authorizes the Industrial 
Commission to enjoin any employer from further operation of business where the employer has 
failed to provide for payment of benefits. 
Plaintiff ignored the continuing jurisdiction of the appropriate forum and filed this 
action despite the remedies available. Plaintiffs recourse for alleged non-payment or delayed 
payment would be to return to the Industrial Commission to enforce the orders arising therefrom 
This simple solution could have been adopted at any time, including the first moment that plaintiff 
allegedly experienced problems getting bills paid. That simple solution would have ended this 
matter efficiently and effectively. That is the purpose of an administrative remedy If plaintiff has 
her way, the district courts will find themselves performing the duties assigned exclusively to the 
industrial commission, creating an inefficient and ineffective procedure in disregard of the statutory 
delegation of powers. 
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POINT II 
PLAINTIFF CANNOT MAINTAIN A BAD FAITH CLAIM AGAINST THE 
DEFENDANTS BECAUSE THERE IS NO PRIVITY OF CONTRACT. 
A third-party claimant, such as plaintiff, cannot maintain a cause of action against 
a party who is self-insured for workers' compensation purposes because she lacks privity of 
contract. Savage v. Educators Ins. Co., 908 P.2d 862 (Utah 1995). Savage follows firmly 
established Utah law which holds that privity of contract must exist before a "bad faith" action can 
be brought. Utah law recognizes only "first-party" bad faith actions. E.g., ArnicaMut. Ins. Co. v. 
Schettler, 768 P.2d 950, 958 (Utah App. 1989). 
In Savage, the plaintiff, Savage, was employed by the Jordan School District 
("District") as a bus driver As in the present case, the District was self-insured for workers' 
compensation purposes.1 During her employment, Savage was involved in an automobile accident, the 
result of which caused Savage serious injuries. Savage filed a worker's compensation claim against the 
District with the Industrial Commission of Utah. A settlement was reached between Savage and the District 
under which the District agreed to pay Savage's medical expenses. Savage subsequently filed a Complaint 
and later an Amended Complaint in District Court against the District's insurance administrator, alleging 
it failed to satisfy its obligation under the settlement agreement. Savage asserted similar causes of action 
as those alleged in the present case: bad faith and intentional infliction of emotional distress. In addition, 
Savage asserted causes of action for breach of good faith and fair dealing, breach of contract, breach of 
1
 The District's workers' compensation insurance was administered by Educators Insurance 
Company. The Court specifically noted that such an arrangement had no effect on the Court's ruling. At 
bar, plaintiff was an employee of Payless ShoeSource, Inc.; her claims were administered by The May 
Department Stores Company, Western Regional Claims Office. 
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fiduciary relationship and interference with a protected property interest. Pursuant to defendant's Motion 
for Summary Judgment, the trial court dismissed Savage's claim on the basis that Savage lacked privity of 
contract with the administrator of the District's insurance. 
The Utah Court of Appeals and subsequently the Utah Supreme Court held that Savage 
could not bring a cause of action for breach of the covenants of good faith and fair dealing as such an action 
may be brought only by a party to the insurance contract. Savage, 908 P.2d 862, 865 (Utah 1995). Both 
courts made reference to the line of cases from which this conclusion "naturally" flows: Ammerman v 
Farmers Ins. Exch., 430 P.2d 576 (Utah 1967), Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 701 P.2d 795 (Utah 1985); and 
Pixton v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 809 P.2d 746 (Utah App. 1991). The court summarized the 
evolution: 
In Ammerman, we recognize a tort cause of action for breach 
of an insurer's obligation to bargain properly in the context 
of a third-party insurance relationship. We concluded that 
insureds have a right to expect their insurers to represent the 
insured's interest by acting reasonably and in good faith in 
settling third-party claims against insureds and that under 
traditional agency principles, the insurer's contractually 
created duty to its insured was a fiduciary one, a breach of 
which sounded in tort. . . 
Although in Ammerman we adopted a tort remedy in the 
context of the third-party insurance contract because of the 
fiduciary nature of the relationships created by the contract, 
we have specifically rejected the tort-based approach in the 
first-party context where the relationship created by the 
insurance contract is not a fiduciary one. In Beck, we discuss 
the nature of the duty of good faith and fair dealing that 
exists in a first-party insurance contract. We noted that the 
factors which had led us to adopt a tort-based remedy in the 
third-party context were absent in the first-party insurance 
contracts. 
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Taken together. Beck and Ammerman demonstrate that the 
duty of good faith and fair dealing is a contractual covenant, 
one that arises solely as an incident to contractual obligations 
owed by an insurer to its insured. 
Savage, 908 P.2d at 865-66. The court unequivocally concluded that because Savage had no contractual 
relationship with Educators Insurance Company, she had no cause of action against it for breach of the 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The court further noted that that conclusion was consistent with the 
commentators and the great majonty of courts in other jurisdictions that have addressed this issue.2 Id. at 
866 
2
 The Pixton decision included reference to OK Lumber Co., Inc. v. Providence Washington Ins. 
Co., 759 P.2d 523, 525-26 (Alaska 1988) (refusing to extend duty of good faith and fair dealing owed by 
insurer to third-party claimant as the common law duty only benefits the insured, stating "[a]n insurer 
could hardly have fiduciary relationship both with the insured and a claimant because the interests of the 
two are often conflicting"); Scroggins v. Allstate Ins. Co., 74 111. App.3d 1027, 30 Ill.Dec. 682, 685, 393 
N.E.2d 718, 721 (1979) (in the absence of statutory or contractual authority, third-party claimant cannot 
sue insurer for breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing as "that duty is one which the insurer owes to 
its insured, not to third parties"); Linscott v. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co., 368 A.2d 1161, 1163 (Me. 
1977) ('"duty of good faith and fair dealing' in the handling of claims runs only to an insurance 
company's insured"); Bean v. Allstate Ins. Co., 285 Md. 572, 403 A.2d 793 (Ct. App. 1979) ("insurer 
owes no duty to a claimant to settle a claim . . . obligation to deal with settlement offers in good faith runs 
only to insured") (citing Ammerman [v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 19 Utah 2d 251, 430 P.2d 576, 578-79 
(1967)]; Chavez v. Chenoweth, 89 N.M. 423, 553 P.2d 703 (1976) (duty to deal in good faith applies 
between insurer and insured); Niemeyer v. United States Fidelity and Guar. Co., 789 P.2d 1318 (Okla. 
1990) (in the absence of statutory or contractual relationship, third-party claimants cannot bring bad faith 
action against insurer as they are strangers to the contract); Auclair v. NationwideMut. Ins. Co., 505 A.2d 
431 (R.I. 1986) (no duty or fiduciary obligation running from insurer to third-party claimant); Kranzush v. 
Badger State Mut. Casualty Co., 103 Wis.2d 56, 307 N.W. 2d 256 (1981) (insurer's duty of good faith 
arises from contract and runs to insured and cannot be implied in favor of third-party claimant as claimant 
is stranger to contract and fiduciary relationship it represents). See Pixton, 809 P.2d at 750. See also 
Broadwater v. Old Republic Surety, 854 P.2d 527, 536 (Utah 1993); St. Joseph fs Hosp. and Medical 
Center v. Reserve Life Ins. Co., 154 Ariz. 303, 742 P.2d 804, 807 (Ct. App. 1986), vacated in part on 
other grounds, 154 Ariz. 307, 742 P.2d 808 (1987); Gunny v. Allstate Ins. Co., 108 Nev. 344, 830 P.2d 
1335, 1335-35 (1992); United Fire Ins. Co. v. McClelland, 105 Nev. 504, 780 P.2d 193, 197 (1989); 
Roach v. Atlas Life. Ins. Co., 769 P.2d 158, 161 (Okla. 19*9); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Amick, 680 P.2d 362, 
365 (Okla. 1984); Kranzush v. Badger State Mut. Cas. Co., 103 Wis. 2d 56, 307 N.W. 2d 256, 265 
(1981). 
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The holding in Savage is directly applicable to the present case. Defendants are self-insured. 
Plaintiff has no privity of contract with defendants in a workers' compensation insured-insurer context.3 
Plaintiff did not purchase the insurance as would be the case in a first-party contractual relationship. 
Plaintiffs status as an employee is that of a claimant, exactly the same as in an automobile accident, where 
Party B makes a claim against Party A's insurance company. According to Savage and the numerous other 
Utah cases, plaintiff is a third-party claimant. As a result, plaintiff's cause of action against defendants for 
bad faith and her claim for punitive damages was correctly dismissed as a matter of law. 
POINT HI 
PLAINTIFF CANNOT RECOVER UNDER A NEGLIGENT 
INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS CAUSE OF ACTION 
Plaintiff alleges that she has suffered emotional distress as a result of defendants' negligence 
in allegedly failing to pay plaintiff's medical bills timely which defendants knew or should have known 
would result in plaintiff's emotional distress and harm to her credit reputation. However, Utah law does not 
allow for recovery in such a case. At bar, plaintiff's claim is the negligent infliction of emotional distress 
claim without any bodily harm or exposure to any threatened bodily harm. 
Utah law is consistent with the analysis of the Restatement (Second) of Torts §313 which 
limits recovery to those plaintiffs in a "zone of danger," who are actually placed in physical danger, fearing 
for their own safety. SccLawson v. Salt Lake Trappers, Inc., 901 P.2d 1013, 1016 (Utah 1995); Boucher 
v. Dixie Medical Center, 850 P.2d 1179, 1182 (Utah 1992). In Lawson, Boucher, and Hansen v. Sea Ray 
Boats, Inc., 830 P.2d 236, 239 (Utah 1992), the plaintiffs' claims for NIED were all dismissed because 
3On page 20 of plaintiff's Brief of Appellant, in her discussion of privity of contract, plaintiff 
asserts, "Appellee admits below in their statement of facts in their Memorandum in Support of Partial 
Summary Judgment [sic]." This fragment inadvertently creates an inference that defendants admit that 
plaintiff is in privity of contract with defendants. This apparent typographical error by the plaintiff 
should not be misconstrued to indicate defendants admit any privity of contract between the plaintiff and 
the defendants on the issues before this Court. 
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plaintiffs were not in a zone of danger. Utah law allows a NIED claim only to "those placed in actual 
physical peril;' Sea Ray Boats, 830 P.2d at 239; see also, Lawson, 901 P.2d at 1016; Boucher, 850 P.2d at 
1182. At bar, plaintiff was never in a zone of danger and was never threatened with physical injury as a 
result of defendants' negligence. 
As the comment to the Restatement (Second) §313 clarifies: 
a. The rule stated in this Section does not give 
protection to mental and emotional tranquility in itself. In 
general as stated in §436Ay there is no liability where the 
actor's negligent conduct inflicts only emotional distress, 
without resulting bodily harm or any other invasion of the 
other's interests. Such emotional distress is important only 
in so far as its existence involves a risk of bodily harm, and 
as affecting the damages recoverable if bodily harm is 
sustained. . . . 
Restatement (Second) of Torts, cmt. a (1965). 
The Restatement of Torts 2d § 436A provides as follows: 
Negligence resulting in emotional disturbance alone. 
If the actor's conduct is negligent as creating an 
unreasonable risk of causing either bodily harm or emotional 
disturbance to another, and it results in such emotional 
disturbance alone, without bodily harm or other compensable 
damage, the actor is not liable for such emotional 
disturbance. 
Restatement of Torts (Second) § 436A (1965). 
Plaintiff relies on Hansen v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 858 P.2d 970 (Utah 1993) for the 
proposition that emotional distress can be claimed absent a physical injury. However, the plaintiffs in 
Mountain Fuel were in fact exposed to bodily injury by inhaling asbestos. Further, those plaintiffs 
experienced physical ramifications, including coughing, wheezing, shortness of breath, chest tightness, 
headaches, and severe eye irritation as a result of their exposure. Mountain Fuel, 858 P.2d at 973. 
Nevertheless, four of the five justices of the Utah Supreme Court have challenged and expressly stated their 
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disagreement with Justice Durham's opinion in that case, criticizing her opinion's "wide-ranging dictum to 
the effect that mental illness, in the absence of a physical manifestation, is sufficient to support a claim." 
Id. at 982 (J. Zimmerman's concurring opinion.) 
Even if Hansen v. Mountain Fuel stood for the proposition that emotional distress can be 
claimed absent a physical injury under Utah law, plaintiffs alleged anxiety does not rise to the level of 
severe emotional distress required in Mountain Fuel. Justice Durham clarified that a negligent infliction of 
emotional distress cause of action would be supported by severe emotional distress and that the severity must 
be such that "a reasonable [person] normal constituted, would be unable to adequately cope with the mental 
stress engendered by the circumstances of the case." Mountain Fuel, 858 P.2d at 975. In upholding the 
dismissal of plaintiffs' claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress, the court stated: 
. . . Everyone must deal with stress and anxiety in daily life; 
most of us experience occasional sleeplessness. Transitory 
sleeplessness and anxiety do not amount to the type of 
emotional distress with which a reasonable person, normally 
constituted, would be unable to cope. 
Mountain Fuel, 858 P.2d at 975. 
Utah law, consistent with the Restatement of Torts, precludes a cause of action for negligent 
infliction of emotional distress where the plaintiff is without any bodily harm or exposure to any threatened 
bodily harm. The trial court's dismissal of plaintiffs claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress was 
correct as a matter of law. 
CONCLUSION 
The Utah Workers' Compensation Act provides an exclusive remedy and precludes any 
other civil action against an employer by an employee. A multitude of remedies are available to this plaintiff 
through the Industrial Commission forum, which is the appropriate and only forum for her claims. Plaintiff 
has no privity of contract with the defendants and thus cannot maintain a cause of action for bad faith under 
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the long line of Utah cases addressing this issue. Utah law mandates that a plaintiff be at risk for physical 
injury in order to maintain a negligent infliction of emotional distress claim. Utah law, consistent with the 
Restatement of Torts, provides that there is no liability where an actor's conduct inflicts only emotional 
distress Even if Utah allowed such a claim for emotional distress without physical injury, the threshold 
would be "severe emotional distress" and not the "stress" and anxiety in daily life, such as being informed 
there is a "blip" on one's credit report. Defendants respectfully request that this Court affirm the trial court's 
granting of defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment and dismiss plaintiffs claims on appeal. 
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